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PART THREE
Property Law
LANDLORD AND TENANT
THOMAS A. WILLS*
This survey includes Florida Supreme Court cases reported from
June 1953 through August 1955. No legislation appropriate to the Survey
was found.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
The author of the previous Sune 1 stressed Stenor v. Lestor'-' and
related cases3 involving the security deposit-liquidated damages problem.
The judges who decided Kanter v. Safran4 and Hyman v. Cohen,5 (dis-
cussed in this article), emphasized a similar problem in such a closely
related manner that for purposes of continuity and integration the following
portion of the previous survey is included:
The first case to approach this problem was Stenor v. Lester.
The facts were as follows: the lessee of a leasehold for a term of
five years, at a rental of $11,200 per year, deposited $11,200 as
security. The lease provided that the lessor should retain the
deposited security as liquidated damages for breach of any of
the terms or covenants of the lease, or apply it as a pro tauta
amount for the lessor's actual damages from such breach. The
court held that where a sum is to be kept as liquidated damages
or applying it against actual damages, such provisions will be
construed as a penalty. Three cases followed, which prescntcd
closely correlative fact situations, and were decided in accord
with the Stenor case. However, in North Beach Investment v.
Scheikowitz, the court held a similar provision to be valid as
providing for liquidated damages.
In the Hyrnan case the judges referred to a distinction between a
provision for forfeiture of the deposit for the breach of any covenant
in the lease, and a provision for forfeiture upon termination of the lease.
They indicated that the former should not be construed as liquidated
*Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law.
1. 8 MIAMI L.Q. 425 (1954).
2. 58 So.2d 673 (Fla. 1952).
3. Kaplan v. Katz, 58 So.2d 853 (VIa. 1952); Nash v. Bailey, 58 So.2d 6S0 (Fla.
1952); Glyn v. Roberson, 58 So.2d 676 (Fla. 1952).
4. 68 So.2d 553 (Fla. 1953).
5. 73 So.2d 393 (Fla. 1954).
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damages, but that the latter might be so construed. The lease contained
a provision for a cash bond to guarantee the performance of all the
covenants and for forfeiture of the bond if the lessor cancelled the lease
upon default by the lessee. The lease did not provide for forfeiture upon
the breach of any covenant by the lessee. The judges declared that the
rule of the Stenor case should not apply because the lease in that case
contained a provision for forfeiture upon the breach of any covenant.
They attempted to clarify the situation with respect to related cases by
the following statement:
We wish to make clear, then-and will repeat for emphasis-
that where a lease provides for a deposit 'to secure the full
performance' of all the covenants of the lease, or similar language,
without providing for the forfeiture of the deposit for the mere
breach of any of the covenants, but only upon the premature
termination of the lease by the lessor for the default of the lessee,
the cited rule (as to breach of covenants of widely varying im-
portance) has no application to a determination of the question
of whether the parties have stipulated for a penalty or for
liquidated damages. As noted above, it must be assumed that
the lease in the Stenor case provided for forfeiture upon the
mere breach of a covenant, so that the rule was properly applied
in that case; but insofar as the latter decisions of this court which
were decided on the authority of the Stenor case, to wit, Nash
v. Bailey, Fla. 58 So.2d 680; Glynn v. Robertson, Fla. 58 So.2d
676 and Kaplan v. Katz, Fla. 58 So.2d 853, may be construed to
hold the contrary, they are hereby expressly modified to that
extent.
A further point in the decision to the effect that the rule of the
Stenor case should not apply to the Hyman case, involved an inter-
pretation of the Hyman case. This case provided for termination at the
option of the lessor upon the breach of a covenant by the lessee. Some
might consider this provision as tantamount to the Stenor provision. The
judges argued that, in spite of the provision, the Hyman lease was different
in that there was only one event, the premature termination of the lease,
which would result in forfeiture. They attempted to fortify the point by
asserting that an attempted termination for breach of covenant might
be enjoined. Some readers may be satisfied by these arguments; others
may not.
Following the usual generalities, the judges concluded that, at the
time of leasing, the damages were difficult to ascertain; the amount of
deposit ($25,000-rent for one year) was not so high as to be a penalty;
and thus the deposit was held to be liquidated damages.
The judges in the Kanter case followed the generalization that a
provision for additional damages over the amount of the deposit is con-
tradictory to the purpose of liquidation. They cited the Stenor case and
held that the security fund was not liquidated damages where the lease
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provided for a security fund which was labeled "liquidated and agreed
upon damages" and provided that the lessor might make the lessee pay any
existing damages if the actual damages exceeded the security fund.
EFFECT OF SURRENDER
Both the Hyman and Kanter cases involved the effect of surrender by
the lessee.
In the Hyman case the judges indicated that in the event the lessee
tailed to pay rent and surrendered possession, the lessor had the choice
of three courses of action. He might treat the lease as terminated and
resume possession for his own purposes, repossess for the account of the
lessee and hold the lessee for general damages, or stand by and sue the
lessee either for each rent installment as it became due or for the entire
rent when it matured. The lessee was behind in the rent payments. The
lessor notified the lessee that he must pay or surrender possession. The
lessee gave up possession. The lessor rented the premises to a corporation
formed by the lessor for that purpose. The lessor did not notify the
lessee that the renting was for the account of the lessee. The judges in a
declaratory opinion determined that the lessor had chosen the first option-
repossession for his own benefit with the intention that the lease be
terminated rather than rescinded so that the lessee remained liable.
In the Kanter case the judges reached a conclusion by determining
which of the three options the lessor chose and whether or not his sub-
sequent conduct was consistent with his choice. The assignee of the
lessee was behind in rent payments. He notified the lessor that he intended
to surrender possession. The lessor notified the assignee that the proposed
surrender was refused and if it became necessary to re-enter, the lessor
would do so for and on the assignee's account, and the assignee would
be held in general damages. Subsequently the lessor re-entered. The
judges decided that where the assignee was put on notice of the conditions
of re-entry, the assignee would be held to have agreed to the express
conditions by his act of surrender, and that there was no need to consider
implied conditions of surrender by operation of law,
The judges then considered whether or not the lessor subsequently
behaved in a contradictory manner by re-entering for the account of the
assignee. They considered the evidence insufficient and remanded the
case so that additional evidence could be accumulated.
EFFECT OF LESsEE REMAINING IN POSSESSION
In deciding Painter Y. Town of Groveland,G the judges cited, inter-
pretated and applied Florida Statute Sections 83.04 (1953) and 83.06
(1953). Section 83.04 provides:
6. 79 So.2d 765 (Fla. 1955).
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1 IOLIfNC OVER AiIR 'l'i:rIt 0 'IOFNANCY AT WIIENCE, ETC.
\Vhen any tenancy shall have been created by an instrument of
writing and the term of which such tenancy is limited therein
shall have expired and the tenant shall hold over in the possession
of said premises without renewing the said lease by some further
instrument of writing then such holding over shall be construed
to be a tenancy at sufferance, and the mere payment or acceptance
of rent shall not be construed to be a renewal of the said term,
but if such holding over be continued with tie written consent
of the lessor then such tenancy shall become a tenancy at will
under the provisions of this law.
The judges decided that where there was no written consent by
the lessor, the effect of the lessee holding over was not to renew the
lease but to create a tenancy at sufferance, thus entitling the lessor to
possession.
Section 83.06 (1953) provides:
RIcinT TO DEMAND DOUBLE RENT UPON REFUSAL TO DELIVER PossEssIoN
When any tenant shall refuse to give up possession of the
premises at the end of his lease, the landlord, his agent, attorney
or legal representatives, may demand of such tenant double the
monthly rent, and may recover the same at the expiration of every
month, or in the same proportion for a longer or shorter time
by distress, in the manner pointed out hereinafter.
All contracts for rent, verbal or in writing, shall bear interest
from the time the rent shall become due, any law, usage or custom
to the contrary notwithstanding.
The judges decided that where the lessee had reasonable grounds
to believe, and did believe, that the lease was valid, and the pleadings
indicated that there was no demand for double rent, the lessee was not
liable for double rent under the statute.
The judges in Rosamond v. Mann' were concerned with whether or
not Section 83.04 modified the generalization, that in the absence of
agreement to the contrary, the character and terms of holdover are governed
by the original lease in so far as applicable. They decided that limitations
in the original lease relative to transfer of a liquor license were applicable
to the holdover and that Section 83.04 did not relieve the lessee of the
limitation.
The judges in Leibowitz v. Christo8 stated that: "There are no decisions
in this State on this subject." The lessee had remained in possession
past the term of the lease, had notified the lessor of his intention to renew,
but did not execute a new lease since the original written lease provided
for "additional annual renewals." They observed that generally where a
7. 80 So.2d 317 (Fla. 1955).
8. 75 So2d 692 (Fla. 1954).
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lcase provides for an extension, a ncw lcasc is not required, but that wherc
the lease provides for renewal, the judges in different jurisdictions do not
agrec. InI a declaratory opinion, the judges here concluded that the dis-
tinction between renewal and extension is too refined to be practical,
and that a written lease was not required.
FORMATION OF LFLsa
In Waldo v. U. S. Ramie Corp. the question of lien rights involved
the determination of whether or not a lease had been formed. The
judges decided that allegations of "belief" that a written agreement had
been executed were insufficient without production of the instrument or
specification of the terms.
In South Dade Farms v. Peters'0 the original lease had six documents
attached which comprised letters exchanged between the lessor and lessee
wherein they agreed to renew the lease. The lessee prepaid the rent under
the renewal. The judges held a renewal modifying the original lease was
formed which would support specific performance.
COVENANTS THAT RUN WITH LAND--OPTION TO Buy
In Rosello v. Hayden"1 the assignee of the lessee obtained a decree
for specific performance of an option to purchase on credit. The judges
held that where the option to purchase is on credit, but the full cash
price is tendered, the covenant runs with the land.
EASEMENTS
In Robinson v. Feltus,'2 the decision relative to aii injunction was
resolved by an interpretation of the words "the south 12'." The words
were interpreted as descriptive of the location rather than limiting the
area, and thus an encroachment which did not prevent ingress and egress
would not be enjoined.
PROPORTIONMENT AND RECONSTRUCTION IN RECEIVERSHIP PROCEEDINGS
Beach Resort Hotel Corporation v. Wieder'3 was an action to enjoin
cancellation of a hotel lease and for other relief, A receiver was appointed.
The lease provided that the lessee would make improvements not to exceed
$200,000 in cost. The improvements were to be paid by the lessee partly
in cash and the balance from profits. The judges decided that in order
to distribute the profits between the parties in receivership proceedings,
a determination must be made as to the amount of permanent improve-
ments beneficial to the lessor and the amount of other improvments
9. 74 So.2d 106 (Fla. 1954).
10. 69 So.2d 890 (Fla. 1954),
11. 79 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1955),
12. 68 So.2d 815 (Fla. 1953).
13. 79 So.2d 659 (Fla. 1955),
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contracted by the lcssor separately. 'rhcy rulcd out in absence of fraud,
or other equitable grounds, the lease would not be reconstructed. Three
judges dissented on the basis that by the majority decision, if the lesse
did not pay for sums contracted by the lessor, tie lessor could use the
failure as an excuse to cancel the lease and still own the improved
property.
BREACH OF COVENANT AND RIGHT OF TERMINATION
The judges in Sunny Isles Boat Works v. North Miami Beach Yacht
Basin'4 decided that gradual depreciation does not constitute a breach of
covenant to maintain docks and piles in a good and safe condition and
good repair.
NEGLIGENCE
Several cases' 5 involving alleged negligence by the lessor were decided
according to the usual principles of tort law, and did not involve aspects
particularly pertinent to this Survey.
14. 70 So.2d 899 (Fla. 1954).
15. Sampson v. Stanley Corp, 75 So.2d 186 (Fla. 1954) (ceiling plaster); Sellers
v. Kilis, 74 So.2d 71 (Fla. 1954) (stairs); Ntssbaum v. Sovereign Hotel Corp., 72 So.2d
814 (Fla. 1954) (lighting); Wilensky v. Perell, 72 So.2d 278 (Fla. 1954) (floor);
Donin v. Goss, 69 So.2d 316 (Fla. 1954) (venetian blind); Gonet v. Evans, 66 So.2d
53 (Fla. 1953) (stairs).
